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Hoagland: The Common Law Covenants, the Covenant of Habitability, and the C

THE COMMON LAW COVENANTS, THE COVENANT
OF HABITABILITY, AND THE COVENANT
AGAINST ENCUMBRANCES
In a modern conveyance of real property it is almost certain that
covenants will be significant in the transaction. 267 Covenants of title relate
to the validity and quality of the title which the grantor possesses 'at the time
he purports to convey and are, in effect, promises to the grantee that the
estate he actually receives is consistent with the recitals in the deed. 26

8

Such

promises are important in that they protect the purchaser of property from
fraud and unscrupulous practices, and provide a remedy in the form of dam26 9
ages in the event that one of the covenants is breached.
There are two methods by which a title covenant may be created. First,
the parties may specifically include the covenant in the deed. Parties may
express covenants freely subject only to public policy and the legality of the
agreement. 270

In Texas, however, title covenants generally become part of

a conveyance by implication. 271 An implied covenant is of full legal effect
and may arise by operation of law, from the use of particular words by the

27
parties, or by statute.

2

267. An exception might be a quitclaim deed, which does not purport to convey land,
but only to relinquish any rights which the grantor may have. See Baldwin v. Drew,
180 S.W. 614, 616 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1915, no writ). See generally Fritz,
The Texas Law of Conveyancing, 3 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. 3, 18 (1962).
268. See generally 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.124 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
269. Dilbeck v. Bill Gaynier, Inc., 368 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Freeman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 165 S.W.2d 111, 115
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1942, no writ); Rosek v. Kotzur, 267 S.W. 759, 762 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1924, no writ).
270. Ragan v. Mosher, 225 S.W.2d 438, 440 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1949, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Klein v. Palmer, 151 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1941,
no writ).
271. Fritz, The Texas Law of Conveyancing, 3 TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. 3, 19
(1962); see, e.g., L-M-S Inc. v. Blackwell, 149 Tex. 348, 353-54, 233 S.W.2d 286, 289
(1950); Schaefer v. Bonner, 469 S.W.2d 216, 220 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1971,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
272. The intention of the parties must be clearly shown in order to imply a covenant
from the contract itself. See, e.g., Freeport Sulphur Co. v. American Sulphur Royalty
Co., 117 Tex. 439, 441, 6 S.W.2d 1039, 1041-42 (1928); Kingsley v. Western Natural
Gas Co., 393 S.W.2d 345, 352-53 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Marvin Drug Co. v. Couch, 134 S.W.2d 356, 361 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1939, writ
dism'd jdgmt cor.); see TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1297 (1962). The statute only
operates upon the use, in the instrument, of certain words. The statute provides:
From the use of the word "grant" or "convey" in any conveyances by which an
estate of inheritance or fee simple is to be passed, the following covenants, and none
other, on the part of the grantor for himself and his heirs to the grantee, his heirs
or assigns, are implied, unless restrained by express terms contained in such conveyance:
1. That previous to the time of the execution of such conveyance the grantor
has not conveyed the same estate, or any right, title or interest therein, to any person other than the grantee.
2. That such estate is at the time of the execution of such conveyance free from
encumbrances.
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Title covenants are distinguishable from restrictive covenants in that the
former guarantee that the estate actually conveyed conforms wih the description in the deed, while the latter relate to the use of the estate after conveyance. Restrictive covenants are sometimes referred to as "negative easements" because most are negative in nature and create a servitude or easement on the land of the grantee. 2 3 For example, the deed may provide that
the grantee will use the land only as a residential area. This agreement binds
the grantee and operates in favor of the grantor because it is the grantor who
may maintain an action in the event of a breach. Title covenants, on the
other hand, bind the grantor for the benefit of the grantee.
Although a condition subsequent, which is a promise by the grantee to do
or not do a given act, 274 and a covenant may be similar in form, they are
easily distinguished by the remedy for their breach.27 5 'Breach of a condition
subsequent results in forfeiture of the estate by the grantee and reinvestment
in the grantor, while breach of a covenant results in a right of action for damages.

27 6

The operation of a particular covenant is determined by its classification
as real or personal. A real covenant is one "having for its object something
annexed to, inherent in, or connected with, land or real property-one which
relates to, touches or concerns the land . ... ,,27 A recent Texas case, Billington v. Riffe, 278 lists three additional requirements-first, that the parties
must intend to make a real covenant; second, that there must be privity of
estate; and third, that either the grantor's heirs and assigns must be expressly
bound by the agreement or the subject matter of the conveyance must be
something in being at the time of the conveyance. 27 9 If these requirements
are met, then a covenant is real in nature. This is important because a real
Such covenants may be sued upon in the same manner as if they had been expressly inserted in the conveyance.
273. Lebo v. Johnson, 349 S.W.2d 744, 74849 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1961,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Saccomanno v. Farb, 492 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
274. It has been held that "a condition subsequent is one which operates upon some
estate . . . already created and vested, and which, if not performed, may defeat it at
the election of the grantor." Alamo Cas. Co. v. Reeves, 258 S.W.2d 211, 214 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1953, no writ).
275. See Zapata v. Torres, 464 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971, no
writ); Dilbeck v. Bill Gaynier, Inc., 368 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) Freeman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 165 S.W.2d 111, 115 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1942, no writ).
276. Dilbeck v. Bill Gaynier,. Inc., 368 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1963 writ ref'd n.r.e.).
277. Panhandle & S.F.R.R. v. Wiggins, 161 S.W.2d 501, 504 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.).; see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Brennan, 385 F.2d 951, 953 (5th
Cir. 1967).
278. 492 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, no writ).

279. Privity of estate can be said to be a mutual or successive interest in the same

estate.

See Panhandle & S.F.R.R. v. Wiggins, 161 S.W.2d 501, 505 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Amarillo 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.). -....
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covenant runs with the land, and, therefore, a subsequent assignee of the
grantor or the grantee assumes the obligations, as well as the benefits, which
arise under the covenant. 280 When these requisites are not met, the covenant
is personal in nature and is binding only on the original parties. 281 It is not
always clear why a particular covenant is classified as real or personal, but
the classification is very important to a subsequent assignee. He must be
careful to determine whether covenants in prior deeds in the chain of title
are real, and binding on him, or merely personal, and have no effect on him.
The various title covenants are not uniformly classified; some are real while
others are personal.
FURTHER ASSURANCE

In the covenant of further assurance the grantor promises to perform all
acts, conveyances, or assurances which are necessary to confirm the purchaser's title and to execute any instruments which are required to perfect
the title of the purchaser. 282 The covenant is usually stated in similar form:
Grantor and all persons hereinafter claiming under him will at any
time hereafter, at the request and expense of grantee, his heirs or assigns
make all such further assurances for the more effectual conveying of
the above-granted premises, with
the appurtenances, as may be rea283
sonably required by him or them.
Although this covenant is common in England, and has been used in some
American states, 28 4 there does not appear to be any mention of it by Texas
courts. Since the covenant of further assurance apparently will not be implied in Texas, it will arise only if expressly stated in the conveyance. 28 5
Further assurance requires only that the grantor insure the conveyance of
280. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.124 (A. Casner ed. 1952).

A covenant

running with the land means that "a liability to perform duties or a right to receive advantages thereof passes to a vendee or other assignee of the land." Panhandle &
S.F.R.R. v. Wiggins, 161 S.W.2d 501, 504 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1942, writ ref'd
W.o.m.).

It seems obvious that in order for a covenant to run with the land, it must pertain
to the land conveyed, that there must be privity of estate between the covenantee

and the later claimant of benefit under the covenant, and that, aside from an express provision of the deed as to whether the covenant shall or shall not run with

the land, the best test is as to whether it enhances the land's value or renders it
more beneficial and convenient to those by whom it is owned or occupied.
3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.124 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
281. Billington v. Riffe, 492 S.W.2d 343, 346 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, no
writ).
282. See Uhl v. Ohio River R.R., 41 S.E. 340, 343 (W. Va. 1902). See also 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.130 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
283. 7 AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2d § 77:33 (1972).
284. Blaum v. May, 16 So. 2d 329, 330 (Ala. 1944); Zabriske v. Baeudendistei, 20
A. 163 (N.J. Ch. 1890); Werner v. Wheeler, 127 N.Y.S. 158, 166 (Sup. Ct. 1911);
Hahn v. Fletcher, 128 S.E. 326, 328 (N.C. 1925); Uhl v. Ohio River R.R., 41 S.E. 340,
343 (W. Va. 1902).
ed. 1952).

See generally 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.130 (A. Casner

285. This is assumed from the fact that the covenant has apparently never been mentioned by a Texas court.
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the estate originally intended to be conveyed. 28 6 For example, in Uhl v.
Ohio River Railroad,28 7 the grantee sought to invoke the covenant to force
the grantor to execute a deed conveying title in fee, which the grantee
claimed he should have received by the original conveyance. The court
looked to the granting clause of the conveyance and determined that it passed
only an easement. Since the granting clause purported to transfer only an
easement, the covenant could be employed to force a valid conveyance only
of that estate, but could not be used to expand or enlarge the estate. 288 Generally, the grantor will not be liable for a breach of the covenant of further
assurance until there is an eviction by one with a superior title; 28 9 thus the
covenant can be said to operate prospectively. 290 The statute of limitations,
which would be based on the contract, does not begin to run when the conveyance occurs, but only on eviction. 29 ' In the event of breach, the amount
of damages awarded is the purchase price plus interest. Since this covenant
obligates the vendor to perfect title, the purchaser may also have an action
in equity for specific performance if he can show that the remedy at law is
292
insufficient.
Further assurance is a real covenant 293 and provides valuable protection
for a purchaser because it allows him to require a grantor to actually convey
the estate originally intended. The requirement of eviction somewhat
negates its effectiveness, however, because the purchaser must wait until he
loses possession in order to recover. It would seem preferable to allow a
purchaser to recover for a breach of the covenant on discovery of some outstanding title inconsistent with the estate conveyed. While the covenant once
provided a useful tool for the protection of purchasers, it appears that its popularity in the United States has declined, and other real covenants are now
29 4
relied on more heavily.
286. Uhl v. Ohio River R.R., 41 S.E. 340, 343 (W. Va. 1902).
287. Id. at 340.
288. Id. at 343.
289. See Blaum v. May, 16 So. 2d 329, 331 (Ala. 1944); Firebaugh v. Wittenburg,
141 N.E. 379, 381-82 (I11. 1923); Building, Light & Water Co. v. Fray, 32 S.E. 58
(Va. 1899). But see Werner v. Wheeler, 127 N.Y.S. 158, 166 (Sup. Qt. 1911). Although a breach may technically occur without eviction, the grantee would be able to
show only nominal damages. The grantor may thus perfect title at any time before eviction.
290. Marathon Builders, Inc. v. Polinger, 283 A.2d 617, 620 (Md. Ct. App. 1971).
There is no breach unless the grantor fails to carry out his promise when a demand is
made.
291. The limitation period is 4 years in Texas. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
5527 (1958).

292. See, e.g., Werner v. Wheeler, 127 N.Y.S. 158 (Sup. Ct. 1911). See also 3
12.130 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
293. See, e.g., Hahn v. Fletcher, 128 S.E. 326, 328 (N.C. 1925).
294. One other covenant of historical interest is the covenant of quantity, which
makes a grantor liable for damages to a grantee when a conveyance is made specifically
by quantity and a shortage subsequently is discovered. Quantity was recognized in
Texas in Weir v. McGee, 25 Tex. (Supp.) 21 (1860). The relevance of the covenant
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §
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QUIET ENJOYMENT

The purchaser whose deed expressly or impliedly contains a covenant of
quiet enjoyment is assured that he may peaceably and quietly enjoy the
premises. The covenant is generally stated,
Grantee, his heirs -and assigns shall at all times hereafter, peaceably
and quietly have, hold, use, occupy, possess, and enjoy the abovegranted premises, and every part and parcel thereof, with the appurtenances, without any suit, molestation, eviction, or disturbance by
grantor, his heirs or assigns,
or by any other person or persons law295
fully claiming the same.
Quiet enjoyment is recognized throughout the United States. 290 While the
covenant is important in Texas leases, its applicability to sales of real property is severely limited. The limitation has arisen primarily because quiet
enjoyment is often considered similar in effect to the covenant of warranty. 29 7
In Texas the warranty covenant is expressed in virtually all conveyances of
an inheritable estate and is relied on primarily in construing rights and obligations of title arising under a deed of sale of real property. 298 Consequently,
quiet enjoyment is rarely if ever considered by Texas courts in litigation arising in this area.
In states where quiet enjoyment is widely employed in deeds of sale, the
covenant has been consistently held to be real and to run with the land. 299
in modern practice is curtailed, however, by the rule that a quantity statement gives way
to a boundary description when the two are not in harmony. See Rahl v. Compton,
112 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1937, writ dism'd). To illustrate, one
Texas court said "a sale is not one by the acre just because the deed mentions a certain
number of acres." Briley v. Hay, 13 S.W.2d 997, 999 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1929,
no writ); accord, Reid v. Byrd, 34 S.W.2d 305, 307 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1930,
no writ). The present warranty covenant provides an adequate remedy to the grantee
who is the unfortunate recipient of a shortage. See Mortgage Inv. Co. v. Bauer, 493
S.W.2d 339, 343 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The necessity for
the covenant is further abrogated by the grantee's remedies in tort or equity. Thus, if
the quantity is stated in the deed, even if only by way of description, the grantee will
often have a remedy for fraud, mutual mistake, or money had and received. See McCord v. Bailey, 200 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1947, no writ); Reid v. Byrd,
34 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1930, no writ); Briley v. Hay, 13 S.W.2d
997, 999-1000 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1929, no writ).
The quantity covenant is not generally considered one of the common law covenants
of title. Should a shortage of acres appear, it seems best to rely on the alternative remedies unless the covenant is expressed in the instrument.
29.5.

7 Am. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2d § 77:34 (1972).

296. See, e.g., Andrus v. St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co., 130 U.S. 643, 648 (1889);
Chicago, Mobile Dev. Co. v. G.C. Coggin Co., 66 So. 2d 151, 156 (Ala. 1953); Standard Live Stock Co. v. Pentz, 269 P. 645, 648 (Cal. 1928); Eggers v. Mitchem, 38 N.W.
2d 591, 592 (Iowa 1949); Linville v. Nance Dev. Co., 304 P.2d 453, 460 (Kan. 1956).
297. Gulf Ref. Co. v. Fetschan, 130 F.2d 129, 132-33 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 318
U.S. 764 (1942).
298. "The deed with a covenant of general warranty is by long odds the most commonly used form of deed in Texas ......
Fritz, The Texas Law of Conveyancing, 3
TEX. REV. COv. STAT. ANN. 3, 18 (1962).
299. See, e.g., Chicago, Mobile.Dev. Co. v. G.C. Coggin Co., 66 So. 2d 151, 156
(Ala. 1953); Linville v. Nance Dev. Co., 304 P.2d 453, 460 (Kan. 1956).
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Thus, a right of action for breach will arise in favor of the person to whom
the land has been conveyed at the time of the breach. For example, in deny-

ing the right of action to a grantee who had conveyed to an assigneee before
the breach, the Alabama Supreme Court said, "The covenant runs as an appurtenant and a right of action for its breach comes into being in favor of

him who by conveyance would at the time of the ouster be deprived of his
'300
right by reason thereof.
A breach of the covenant requires an eviction, actual or constructive, or

a refusal by one with paramount title to relinquish possession to the
grantee.8 0 1 As explained by the Alabama Supreme Court,
'It operates in futuro, unless the true owner is in actual possession at

the time the covenant is entered into, in which case there is a breach
eo instante; it runs with the land, that is, it is intended for the benefit
of the ultimate grantee in whose -time it is broken, 30iand
2 there can be no
breach except by an actual or constructive eviction.'
Although eviction normally must be by one who has paramount title, 30 3 acts
of a third person without paramount title may be sufficient to breach the
covenant if the landlord has authorized such acts.30 4 The grantor therefore
has no responsibility under the covenant unless the third party actually has
a superior right to the demised premises or is authorized by the grantor in
his acts. The remedy in cases of eviction by one without superior title is
not for breach of the covenant, but "is [instead] -to dispossess the intruder"
303
and make legal claim against him.
The covenant of quiet enjoyment is implied in every lease of real property
in Texas, unless there is an express provision to the contrary.3 0 6 The lessee

300. Chicago, Mobile Dev. Co. v. G.C. Coggin Co., 66 So. 2d 151, 156 (Ala. 1953).
301. "Since complainant has suffered no eviction or disturbance in its possession of
the land, it has no right of action for the breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment
.... " Id. at 156; accord, Andrus v. St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co., 130 U.S. 643, 648
(1889); Standard Live Stock Co. v. Pentz, 269 P. 645, 648 (Cal. 1928); Eggers v.
Mitchem, 38 N.W.2d 591, 592 (Iowa 1949); E.B. Jones Motor Co. v. Niedringhaus, 323
S.W.2d 31, 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
302. Chicago, Mobile Dev. Co. v. G.C. Coggin Co., 66 So. 2d 151, 157 (Ala. 1953).
303. See, e.g., Andrus v. St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co., 130 U.S. 643, 648 (1889);
Bowers v. Sells, 123 N.E.2d 194, 197 (Ind. Ct. App. 1954); Brown v. International Land
Co., 116 P. 799, 800 (Okla. 1911). One court has said, "A paramount title is one
which prevails in an action or is successfully asserted." There is no breach "by the existence of an outstanding, but unfounded claim upon the property." Eggers v. Mitchem,
38 N.W.2d 591, 592 (Iowa 1949).
304. Bowers v. Sells, 123 N.E.2d 194, 197 (Ind. Ct. App. 1954); cf. Frazier v. Wynn,
459 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 472
S.W.2d 750 (Tex. 1971).
305. Andrus v. St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co., 130 U.S. 643, 648 (1889). An entry
without paramount title or authorization will cast the person entering into the position
of a wrongdoer who should be personally liable to the owner or tenant for his wrongful
acts.
306. See, e.g., L-M-S Inc. v. Blackwell, 149 Tex. 348, 353-54, 233 S.W.2d 286, 289
(1950); Frazier v. Wynn, 459 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970), rev'd
on other grounds, 472 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. 1971); Richker v. Georgandis, 323 S.W.2d 90,
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is assured that his possession will not be interfered with by the lessor, one
claiming under him, or one with paramount title,3 07 but the covenant has no
application to acts of strangers.308 Breach occurs in the event of eviction,
either actual or constructive,3 0 9 or interference with the peaceable use of the
premises.3 10

For example, an entry into the demised premises by another

tenant of the landlord has been considered a breach. 3 11 An unauthorized
entry by the landlord is a breach, even if it is for the purpose of making
repairs, unless the right to repair is expressly reserved in the lease.31 Additionally, where the lessor enters into a lease of the premises with a third
party during the term of the original lease, the covenant is breached upon
entry by the third party.3 13 In Richker v. Georgandis,31 4 the lessor placed
a barricade in front of the leased restaurant which impaired the view of the

premises, interfered with access, and caused the restaurant to be filled with
dust. The civil appeals court considered this sufficient interference to consti3 15
tute a breach of the covenant.
In the event of a breach, the lessee has a right of action for all damages
which naturally and proximately result from the breach. 31 6 Texas courts
95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.). It has been held in earlier cases
that the implication arises through the use of the word "lease" or "demise." See Nelson
v. Lamb, 252 S.W.2d 713, 714 n.1 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1952, no writ). While it
seems that one of these words will be used in most lease conveyances, the latest cases,
cited above, do not appear to require their use.
307. Atler v. Erskine, 111 S.W. 186 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, writ ref'd); Thomas v.
Brin, 85 S.W. 842, 845 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905, no writ); accord, Andrus v. St. Louis
Smelting & Ref. Co., 130 U.S. 643, 648 (1889); Bowers v. Sells, 123 N.E.2d 194, 197
(Ind. Ct. App. 1954).
308. Atler v. Erskine, IIl S.W. 186 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, writ ref'd); Sedberry v.
Verplanck, 31 S.W. 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, no wiit); accord, Andrus v. St. Louis
Smelting & Ref. Co., 130 U.S. 643, 648 (1889); Bowers v. Sells, 123 N.E.2d 194, 197
(Ind. Ct. App. 1954).
309. Richker v. Georgandis, 323 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). The elements required for a constructive eviction in Texas are set out in
Steinberg v. Medical Equip. Rental Serv., Inc., 505 S.W.2d 692, 696-97 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Dallas 1974, no writ).
310. See, e.g., Richker v. Georgandis, 323 S.W.2d 90, 98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Fort Terrett Ranch Co. v. Bell, 275 S.W. 81, 82 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Austin 1925, no writ).
311. Fort Terrett Ranch Co. v. Bell, 275 S.W. 81, 82 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1925,
no writ); cf. Frazier v. Wynn, 459 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970),
rev'd on other grounds, 472 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. 1971).
312. Higby v. Kirksey, 163 S.W. 315, 316 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1913, writ
ref'd). The case of Stool v. J.C. Penney Co., 404 F.2d 562, 566 n.13 (5th Cir. 1968),
asserts that the rule in Higby is still in force in Texas. As to the existence of a duty
to repair and the corresponding right of entry by a landlord, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357 (1965).
313. See Frazier v. Wynn, 459 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970),
rev'd on other grounds, 472 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. 1971).
314. 323 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
315. Id. For another example see Stephens v. Anderson, 275 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
316. McKenzie v. Carte, 385 S.W.2d 520, 528 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1964,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Richker v. Georgandis, 323 S.W.2d 90, 98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston

1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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have held that lost profits, when they can be ascertained with reasonable certainty from past recorded profits, may be recovered if the premises were being used as an established business. 317 The tenant may also seek the equiis of a continuing nature
table remedy of injunction in cases where the harm
3 18
and will result in irreparable damage to the tenant.
SEISIN AND

GOOD

RIGHT TO CONVEY

The covenants of seisin and good right to convey are synonymous in Texas .3 9 The purpose of the covenant is to assure a grantee that the grantor
is seized of an indefeasible estate of the quality and quantity which he purports to convey. 320 By virtue of article 1297, the covenant is implied in
every conveyance of an inheritable estate which uses the word "grant" or
"convey" unless it is expressly excluded. 32 ' A sample form of the covenant
provides,
At the time of the delivery of these presents, grantor is lawfully seized
in fee
of a good, absolute, and indefeasible estate of inheritance,
322
simple, of all and in singular, the above-granted premises.
While the wording of the statute differs somewhat from this sample, the protection offered is the same.32 3 Both assure a purchaser that his grantor is
the owner of the estate he purports to convey, and they provide a remedy
for breach of the covenant in the event that this is found to be untrue.
The significance of the seisin covenant is that it allows the grantee a right
of action at any time after the conveyance is made if the grantor "does not
own the estate in the land he undertakes to convey. ' 324 The grantee is not
required to wait for an eviction before he can claim relief under the
317. McKenzie v. Carte, 385 S.W.2d 520, 528 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1964,

writ ref'd n.r.e.); Richker v. Georgandis, 323 S.W.2d 90, 98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
318. Nelson v. Lamb, 252 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1952, no writ);

Henderson v. Parish, 265 S.W. 226, 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1924, no writ);
Wicker v. Thomson, 242 S.W. 1106, 1107 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1922, no writ).

319. Childress v. Siler, 272 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1954, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Fender v. Farr, 262 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1953, no

writ).
320. See Childress v. Siler, 272 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1954, writ

ref'd n.r.e.), which states that in the absence of qualifying expressions this covenant is
.'read into every conveyance of land or an interest in land, except in quitclaim deeds."

The case also noted that where the covenant was "contained" in a deed, this fact negated
the idea that it was a quitclaim deed. The covenant was also said to apply to oil and
gas leases. Id. at 420.

321. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1297 (1962); see Childress v. Siler, 272 S.W.2d
417, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
322. 7 AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2d § 66:41 (1972).
323. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1297 (1962) states the covenant: "That previous to the time of the execution of such conveyance the grantor has not conveyed the
same estate, or any right, title or interest therein, to any person other than the grantee."
324. Childress v. Siler, 272 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1954, writ ref'd

n.r.e.).
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covenant. 32 5 For example, in Johns v. Karam Development Co. 326 the assignor conveyed an oil and gas lease, claiming that he had " 'good right and
authority to sell and convey the same,' " and, further guaranteeing and warranting that he was "'the lawful owner and holder of the aforementioned
right and interest under the original lease.' ",327 Soon after the conveyance
the assignee discovered that the assignor did not have any interest in the minerals at the time he purported to convey, and the assignee brought suit. The
El Paso Court of Civil Appeals held that the "language appellant used in
his assignment

. . .

amounted to covenants of seisin and of good right to

convey" and held that "[s]ince appellant did not own the estate he undertook
to convey, there was a total failure of title which breached the covenants of
'328
seisin and good right to convey at the time the instrument was made.
While the covenant offers this advantage of suit without eviction, it is personal in nature and will be of no benefit to an heir or assignee of the original
3 29
party.
The remedy for breach of a covenant of seisin, as with all covenants, is
damages. If there is a complete failure of title, the grantee's damages are
generally held to be the consideration paid, up to the amount of the purchase
price, plus interest.3 30 The measure of damages is not so clearly defined in
instances of a partial failure of title. It is not unlikely that the plaintiff will
be granted an amount equal only to the proportion of the purchase price
which the loss bears to the whole of the conveyance. 331 While this test appears fair in a case where the value of all the land conveyed is substantially
equal, it will not be so where there is a material difference in the values of
sections of the property. Where such a difference exists, the best rule would
be to allow recovery of actual damages. This may be measured by subtracting the value of the land actually conveyed from the amount of consideration
paid. Equity should require, however, that the recovery be limited to the
purchase price.
33 2
Although the statute of limitations applicable to seisin is four years,
325. See, e.g., Johns v. Karam Dev. Co., 381 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
326. Id.
327. Id. at 934.
328. Id. at 936; accord, Fender v. Farr, 262 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1953, no writ).
329. Childress v. Siler, 272 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1954, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
330. Johns v. Karam Dev. Co., 381 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex; Civ. App.-El Paso 1964,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Childress v. Siler, 272 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1954,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
331. This is substantially the test set out in City of Beaumont v. Moore, 146 Tex.
46, 54, 202 S.W.2d 448, 453 (1947). Although this is an accepted test in the instance
of a partial failure of title under a covenant of warranty, its applicability is questionable in cases concerning the covenant against encumbrances.
332. Cf. Schneider v. Lipscomb County Nat'l Farm Loan Ass'n, 146 Tex. 66, 77, 202

S.W.2d 832, 838 (1947).
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there is no direct authority specifying when the statute begins to run. Since
breach of this covenant occurs when the covenant is executed, the statute
might reasonably begin to run at the time conveyance is accomplished. Since
the seisin covenant, like the covenant against encumbrances, is breached
when made,33 3 Texas courts might choose to adopt a rule similar to that applied in cases of breach of the covenant against encumbrances-that a technical breach at the time the covenant was made is immaterial.3 3 4 Applying
this concept to the covenant of seisin, the statute would not begin to run until
there was some interference with the grantee's possession or some other event
33 5
to put the grantee on notice that a breach had occurred.
Without the implied covenant of seisin the modern buyer would have no
implied guarantee that his grantor had title to the property conveyed. If this
were the case, the doctrine of caveat emptor would dictate that there would
be no remedy based on the sale, and the buyer would be forced to prove
a case of fraud or mutual mistake.
COVENANT AGAINST ENCUMBRANCES

The covenant against encumbrances insures that there are no liens or other
encumbrances on the conveyed property.3 36 It is designed to protect the purchaser against outstanding interests which, while consistent with the title
passed by the Vendor, diminish the value or impair the enjoyment of the
estate conveyed.3 37 The covenant generally provides,
The premises conveyed by the within deed are free, clear, and discharged of and from all former and other grants, titles, charges, judgments, executions, taxes, assessments, and encumbrances of whatsoever nature or kind; and further, neither grantor nor any other person
or persons whomsoever have done or suffered anything whereby the
title of the premises conveyed by the within deed, 3 3or any part thereof,
can or may be frustrated or annulled in any manner. 8
Since in Texas the covenant is implied in every deed using the word "grant"
or "convey" which transfers an inheritable estate, unless contrary terms are
expressed in the deed,3 39 it is sometimes said that a "general warranty clause
333. City of Beaumont v. Moore, 146 Tex. 46, 54, 202 S.W.2d 448, 453 (1947).
334. Seibert v. Bergman, 91 Tex. 411, 413-14, 44 S.W. 63, 64 (1898).

See also

Wolff v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 345 S.W.2d 565, 568 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
335. Cf. McCord v. Bailey, 200 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1947,
no writ).
336. See TEx. REv.Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 1297, 1298 (1962).
337. See Ragsdale v. Langford, 358 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ausiin 1962,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Faull v. City of Dallas, 97 S.W.2d 1031, 1033 (Tex. Civ. App.-El

Paso 1936, writ dism'd). In City of Dayton v. Allred, 123 Tex. 60, 74, 68 S.W.2d 172,
178 (1934), an encumbrance was defined as including "liens, and any other burden resting on the property itself, or on its title, which tends to lessen its value, or interfere
with its free enjoyment."
338. 7 AM. JuR. LEGAL FORMS 2d § 77:44 (1972).
339. Ta". REv. Cv. STAT. ANN. art. 1297 (1962); see City of Beaumont v. Moore,
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includes a covenant against encumbrances. ' 340 While this may be true, the
statement that a covenant of general warranty includes a covenant that "the
property conveyed is free from encumbrances" leads to confusion. 34 ' The
covenant of general warranty and the covenant against encumbrances are different and should be distinguished; the covenant of warranty relates to the
grantor's title and his duty to defend the vendee's title, while the covenant
against encumbrances is designed to protect against burdens on the land
which exist independently of the title conveyed. The title conveyed, for example a fee simple, is perfectly valid even if a lien exists on the property.
In this situation, then, the covenant of warranty is not breached because the
estate purportedly conveyed is actually conveyed. The covenant against encumbrances is breached, however, because the lien diminishes the value of
the estate.
An additional distinction exists in that the covenant against encumbrances
is "a covenant in praesenti, which is breached, if at all, upon the execution
'3 42
and delivery of the deed, though damages may not arise until a later date.
As a result, the covenant is breached when title passes if there is a burden
or encumbrance on the land at that time. 343 On the contrary, the covenant
of warranty is breached only on eviction or interference with the grantee's
3 44
possession.
While article 1298 defines the term "encumbrances," it does not contain
a complete list of all the types of burdens on land which may constitute a
146 Tex. 46, 54, 202 S.W.2d 448, 453 (1947); Schaefer v. Bonner, 469 S.W.2d 216, 220
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Ragsdale v. Langford, 358 S.W.
2d 936, 938 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
340. Triplett v. Shield, 406 S.W.2d 941, 947 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1966, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
341. Fannin Inv. & Dev. Co. v. Neuhaus, 427 S.W.2d 82, 88 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, no writ). An example of the confusion which exists in this
area is Ledbetter v. Howard, 395 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965, no writ),
concerning loss of the buyer's land because of foreclosure of a prior tax lien. Despite
the fact that a tax lien is specifically included as an encumbrance by TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 1298 (1962), the court appeared to have considered the lien as a breach
of the covenant of warranty. In Morris v. Short, 151 S.W. 633 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1912, writ ref'd), the court held that the existence of paramount title in a third
person at the time of the conveyance was a breach of the covenant against encumbrances. As shown by the definition of the covenant, it is not designed to protect
against defects in the title and the breach appears to properly have been of the covenant
of warranty.
342. City of Beaumont v. Moore, 146 Tex. 46, 54, 202 S.W.2d 448, 453 (1947).
"Appellant's covenant against encumbrances was broken upon execution of the deed.
. .. This is true because an encumbrance existed at the time of the execution of the
deed." Triplett v. Shield, 406 S.W.2d 941, 948 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1966, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
343. While the covenant is technically breached at this point, however, the right of
action will be for nominal damages only until the buyer is evicted or forced to incur
some expense. See Wolff v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 345 S.W.2d 565, 568 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hill v. Provine, 260 S.W. 681, 683 (Tex.
Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1924, writ dism'd).
344. See generally 3 AmmucAN LAw oF PROPERTY § 12.129 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
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breach of the covenant.3 4 5 Liens in general, as well as tax liens specifically,
are expressly included, and usually present no problem of interpretation. 346
One complicating factor in this area, however, is in determining if a breach
has actually occurred; if the lien has not attached when title passes, then the
covenant has not been breached. Controversy may arise when an assessment
or other encumbrance attaches while the purchaser is in possession, but before the deed is delivered. It is usually held that possession passes the equitable title, and thus an encumbrance does not breach the covenant.
[A]lthough the legal title does not pass to the vendee under a contract
of sale until actual delivery of a deed to the property still the vendee
under such contract of purchase, especially where he goes into possession of the property, is invested with the equitable title from the date
of the contract, or in any event, from the date he takes possession,
or loss thereto without fault
,and . . . any detriment, depreciation,
347

of either party must be borne by him.
A prior outstanding lease on the property breaches the covenant because
it unquestionably interferes with the enjoyment of the premises. 348 The
existence of a use restriction on the property, such as an enforceable restrictive covenant, may also be considered an encumbrance which breaches the
covenant. 349 An easement, such as a right of way over the demised land,
constitutes at least a technical breach of the covenant.3 50
The covenant against encumbrances is not breached if the encumbrance
is expressly assumed by the grantee. 351 If the grantee has knowledge of the
encumbrance but does not assume it, his knowledge will not bar his suit for
345. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1298 (1962).

346. See, e.g., Triplett v. Shield, 406 S.W.2d 941, 947 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bullitt v. Coryell, 85 S.W. 482, 483 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905, no
writ).
347. Leeson v. City of Houston, 243 S.W. 485, 488 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921, jdgmt
adopted); accord, Ingram v. Central Bitulithic, 51 S.W.2d 1067 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1932, writ ref'd); cf. Bucher v. Employer's Cas. Co., 409 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1966, no writ). Where the assessment is prior to the contract of sale, the
lien has attached and the covenant is breached. See Scott v. Snavely, 394 S.W.2d 42
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
348. See, e.g., Schaefer v. Bonner, 469 S.W.2d 216, 220 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Ragsdale v. Langford, 358 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In the case of an outstanding lease it might be argued
that the title is defective, because a lease interest is a right in the property, and thus
is a breach of the covenants of warranty and quiet enjoyment. This might explain the
confusion of terms which seem to abound in cases dealing with leases.
349. Levine v. Turner, 264 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1954, writ
dism'd) (restriction limiting property to certain types of residential use). "As a general
rule such restrictions as to the use to which premises may be put constitute encumbrances under a contract by which the vendor obligates himself to make a good or marketable title free and clear of encumbrances." Id. at 479. See also Newman v. Hasslocher, 242 S.W.2d 822, 823 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1951, no writ).
350. Cf. Rosenfield v. Pollock Realty Co., 416 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1967, no writ).
351. See Triplett v. Shield, 406 S.W.2d 941, 947 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1966,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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breach, but will be effective to mitigate his damages.3 52
The remedy for breach of the covenant is damages rather than rescission. 35 3
While the covenant is technically breached when made,3 54 the remedy is
limited to nominal damages until the purchaser is forced to pay off the encumbrance, a forfeiture occurs, or there is !an eviction or inability to gain
possession of the property because of an outstanding lease. 355 The covenant
is one of indemnity and, therefore, affords no substantial remedy until the
purchaser incurs actual damages.3 56
The general measure of damages should be the difference between the
value of the property with and without the encumbrance. The value of the
property without the encumbrance is usually measured by the consideration
paid.3 5 7 For example, if the encumbrance causes a complete failure of title,
,the property would have no value, and the damages would amount to the en,tire purchase price. In cases where the vendee pays off the encumbrance, the
difference in value-and therefore the amount of the damages-is generally
considered to be the amount paid to remove the encumbrance. 358
A problem concerning damages arises in cases where the grantee is unable
to take possession because the premises are encumbered by a prior lease. In
City of Beaumont v. Moore3 59 the city conveyed a mineral lease on land
352. City of Beaumont v. Moore, 146 Tex. 46, 57, 202 S.W.2d 448, 455 (1947);
Schaefer v. Bonner, 469 S.W.2d 216, 220 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1971, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
353. Hill v. Provine, 260 S.W. 681, 682-83 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1924, writ
dism'd); see Ussery v. Hollebeke, 391 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1965,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dilbeck v. Bill Gaynier, Inc., 368 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
354. City of Beaumont v. Moore, 146 Tex. 46, 54, 202 S.W.2d 448, 453 (1947).
355. Wolff v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 345 S.W.2d 565, 568 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Tindle v. Elms, 108 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1937, no writ); McLendon v. Federal Mortgage Co., 60 S.W.2d 324, 326 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1933, writ ref'd); Hill v. Provine, 260 S.W. 681, 683 (Tex. Civ. App.
-El Paso 1924, writ dism'd).
356. See, e.g., Wolff v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 345 S.W.2d 565, 568 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
357. "In cases of this character, the proper measure of damage is the difference in
the value of the land at the time of purchase without the [encumbrance], and its value
with the [encumbrance]." Pochyla v. Cralle, 42 S.W.2d 793, 794 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1931, no writ). "The plaintiff may further recover for interest and taxes paid
if he was never in possession or if his occupancy was not beneficial." Ledbetter v. Howard, 395 S.W.2d 951, 953 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965, no writ); accord, City of Beaumont v. Moore, 146 Tex. 46, 54, 202 S.W.2d 448, 453 (1947).
358. See Carruth v. Allen, 368 S.W.2d 672, 679-80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1963,
no writ); Wolff v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 345 S.W.2d 565, 568 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Houston 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Schaefer v. Bonner, 469 S.W.2d 216, 221-22
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.), construing a fee simple conveyance which was found to be encumbered by an outstanding sublease on part of the premises, the court held the measure of damages to be the reasonable rental value of the
premises encumbered for the term of the sublease, less the rental due under the terms
of the sublease. In Faull v. City of Dallas, 97 S.W.2d 1031, 1033 (Tex. Civ. App.El Paso 1936, writ dism'd), it was held that interest may also be awarded. See also
Tindle v. Elms, 108 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1937, no writ).
359. 146 Tex. 46, 202 S.W.2d 448 (1947).
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which was encumbered by a public servitude to the city's airport. The
court found a breach of the covenant against encumbrances, and determined
the measure of damages by a formula of proportionate values:
The covenantor warrants that he will restore the purchase price to the
grantee if the land is entirely lost; and in cases of partial loss the measure of damages is modified so as to allow a recovery of only such proportion of the consideration as the amount of the loss bears to the whole
360
of it.

The application of this rule to a breach of the covenant against encumbrances
is confusing. Its use in Moore may have been valid because the servitude
was not terminable by the vendor and could have been construed as resulting
in a failure of title. Since the conveyance involved was a lease of minerals,
and the outstanding prior lease to the airport was to the surface estate, the
vendor had full title to the estate conveyed. Nevertheless, the purchaser was
unable to enjoy his estate because of the encumbrance. Reasoned in this
manner the title did not actually fail, but the entire value of the estate was
lost because the encumbrance could not be removed by any payment by the
purchaser. Thus, the best measure of damages would have been the purchase price. If the encumbering lease had been only for a portion of the
premises and for a definite period, the best rule would have been to allow
value of the leased premises
rental
damages in the amount of the reasonable 36
1
for the term of the lease, less the rent paid.
The statute of limitations for an action for breach of the covenant against
encumbrances is 4 years. 362 There is, however, some question as to when
the statute begins to run. At least one case has held that the limitation period does not begin to run until there is substantial damage to the purchaser;
a prior technical breach is immaterial.3 63 This appears most equitable because it does not penalize the purchaser if he has had no reason to know
of the encumbrance until more than 4 years after the conveyance.
Like the other title covenants, the covenant against encumbrances exists
to reduce the hardships of the doctrine of caveat emptor. Since the covenant
is implied by statute, it most effectively contravenes the practices of those
grantors who would purposely convey land with an encumbrance and without
an expressed covenant. The covenant may still be negated, however, by the
terms of the instrument or by the grantee's assumption of the encumbrance.
HABITABILITY

The covenant of habitability is an assurance to the purchaser, by the
360. Id. at 54, 202 S.W.2d at 453.
361. This is the rule in Schaefer v. Bonner, 469 S.W.2d 216, 221-22 (Tex. Civ. App.
-San Antonio 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Compare the rule in Moore with the rule in
Ragsdale v. Langford, 358 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1962, writ ref'd

n.r.e.).
362. TEx. RFv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5527 (1958); see City of Beaumont v. Moore,
146 Tex. 46, 52, 202 S.W.2d 448, 452 (1947).
363. Seibert v. Bergman, 91 Tex. 411, 413-14, 44 S.W. 63, 64 (1898).
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builder-vendor of a house, "that such a house was constructed in a good
workmanlike manner and was suitable for human habitation. '36 4 In Texas
the covenant is implied in all conveyances of new homes by a buildervendor.3 65 Prior to the adoption of the covenant of habitability in 1968,
Texas followed the common law rule whereby a purchaser had no warranty
3 66
that the house he bought was well-built or safe for habitation.
In the 1968 case of Humber v. Morton,3 6 7 the supreme court adopted the
covenant of habitability as the rule in Texas. 368 The court first established

that article 1297 does not bar implication of any covenant other than those
specifically allowed by the statute., 6 9 The crucial question then facing the
court was whether the doctrine of caveat emptor should be allowed to stand
as a bar to recovery. The doctrine was viewed as having arisen in the common law based upon the premise that "the buyer and seller dealt at arm's
length, and that the purchaser had means and opportunity to gain information
concerning the subject matter of the sale which were equal to those of the
364. Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1968). The existence of the
covenant is mentioned also in Hollen v. Leadership Homes, Inc., 502 S.W.2d 837, 839
(Tex. Civ. App.-E Paso 1973, no writ) and Diana v. Parks, 433 S.W.2d 761, 763
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1968, no writ).
365. Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 555-56 (Tex. 1968); see Hollen v. Leadership Homes, Inc., 502 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973, no writ); Diana
v. Parks, 433 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1968, no writ).
366. The court in Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 557 (Tex. 1968) viewed the
fall of the doctrine of caveat emptor as having been initiated by: Carpenter v. Donohoe,
388 P.2d 399 (Colo. 1964); Glisan v. Smolenske, 387 P.2d 260 (Colo. 1963); Weck
v. A.M. Sunrise Constr. Co., 184 N.E.2d 728 (111. Ct. App. 1962); Jones v. Gatewood,
381 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963); Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 329 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1958);
Perry v. Sharon Dev. Co., 4 All E.R. 390 (C.A. 1937); Miller v. Cannon Hills Estates,
Ltd., 1 All E.R. 93 (K.B. 1931). The Humber decision also contains a comprehensive
discussion of the development of the covenant and the fall of the common law rule.
367. 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
368. The development of a covenant for the protection of a new home purchaser did
not arise suddenly in Texas. In Loma Vista Dev. Co. v. Johnson, 177 S.W.2d 225, 227
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio), rev'd on other grounds, 142 Tex. 686, 180 S.W.2d 922
(1943), an action for damages by the purchaser against the builder-vendor based on misrepresentations by a real estate broker employed to sell the house, the court said that
"[b]y offering the house for sale as a new and complete structure appellant impliedly
warranted that it was properly constructed and of good material . ... "
In Moore v. Werner, 418 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1967,
no writ), the court of civil appeals analogized the sale of a defective new house to a
sale of personalty and found "no reason for any distinction." The court said that it
was "the seller's duty to perform the work in a good and workmanlike manner and to
furnish adequate materials" and concluded that "the rule of implied warranty of fitness
applies." Id. at 920. The reference to an "implied warranty of fitness" probably arises
from the warranty now set out in TEX. Bus. &COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.315 (1968).
369. The prohibition of article 1297 was held not applicable on the basis that:
The article relates to covenants which may or may not arise from the use of certain
specific words in a conveyance, namely, 'grant' or 'convey'. . . . It relates to the
covenants of title which arise out of conveyances and not to collateral covenants
such as the suitability of a house for human habitation . . . . The implied warranty of fitness arises from the sale and does not spring from the conveyance.
Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 555-56 (Tex. 1968).
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seller. '37" The court felt that this premise was not practically operable today
because the average homebuyer is not in the position to know or discover
defects in the construction of a house. 371 Therefore, basing its decision on
public policy favoring protection of the average homebuyer, the court declared the caveat emptor rule to be an "anachronism patently out of harmony
with modern home buying practices" and held that the covenant of habit3 72
ability should be implied.
The remedy for a breach of the covenant of habitability lies in an action
in tort.37 3 There is little authority concerning the resulting damages, but it
must be assumed that general tort remedies apply. The Houston Court of
Civil Appeals has held that where the defect does not impair the usefulness
74
of the building as a whole, the damages are the reasonable cost of repair.a
Using this rationale, the purchaser should collect the full purchase money
amount only in cases where the defect is so extensive that repair is infeasible.
The statute of limitations against actions in tort is 2 years.37 5 In actions
for breach of the covenant of habitability it has not yet been determined
whether the statute begins to run from the time of conveyance or only from
the time when the purchaser should have reason to know of the defect. The
latter seems more equitable. For example, a purchaser may buy a house
and 2 years later the foundation suddenly collapses, rendering the house unsuitable for human habitation. If the collapse was due to an original construction defect, the purpose of the covenant would be subverted unless the
period of limitation began to run when the purchaser had knowledge, actual
or constructive, of the defect.
The covenant of habitability requires only that a builder-vendor conform
to generally accepted standards of workmanship.3 70 Strict liability does not
apply in such cases: a builder will not be liable if he shows he is free from
fault. He is not made an insurer of the house, but is only required to meet
370. Id. at 557. The court said:
The old rule of caveat emptor does not satisfy the demands of justice in such cases.
The purchase of a home is not an everyday transaction for the average family, and
in many instances is the most important transaction of a lifetime. To apply the
rule of caveat emptor to an inexperienced buyer, and in favor of a builder who is
daily engaged in the business of building and selling houses, is manifestly a denial
of justice.
Id.at 561, quoting Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 415 P.2d 698 (Idaho 1966).
371. Id.at 561.
372. Id. at 562.
373. Id.at 556.
374. Moore v. Werner, 418 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1967, no writ). The necessity of proving damages is shown in Overmyer Co. v. Harbison, 453 S.W.2d 368, 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1970, no writ).
375. TaX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (1958).
376. Two Texas cases have appeared subsequent to Humber which considered the
covenant in differing fact situations. See Hollen v. Leadership Homes, Inc., 502 S.W.2d
837 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973, no writ); Diana v. Parks, 433 S.W.2d 761 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1968, no writ). The covenant is alluded to in Overmyer Co. v.
Harbison, 453 S.W.2d 368, 371-72 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1970, no writ).
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reasonable industry standards. The covenant is a promise that the builder
will not negligently produce a house which fails to meet reasonable standards.
The builder is in the best position to know how to construct a dwelling, and
it is reasonable that the burden of curing. defective construction should ,be
borne by the one responsible for the defect.
CONCLUSION

Covenants protecting a grantee of real property from unfair exchange are
both legally and practically valuable. The convenants of seisin, further assurance, and quiet enjoyment provide protections concerning title to the
estate; the covenant against encumbrances adds a remedy in the event that
there is some outstanding claim on the property, consistent with the title,
which diminishes its value or usefulness. These covenants, as well as the
covenant of habitability, developed as a reaction to the harshness of the doctrine of caveat emptor.
Some criticism might properly be made of the general rule that knowledge
by the grantee of the lack of title or of an encumbrance has no effect. Thus,
while knowledge by the grantee does not diminish the unscrupulous nature
of a grantor's conduct, it may properly be an equitable basis to deny recovery
on a covenant. A grantee who enters into an agreement with knowledge of
a defect has little reason to complain later, at least on the basis of fairness.
Balancing the actions of the parties, however, seems to overcome this
criticism, for the act of conveying non-owned or encumbered property is the
more devious offense to justice, and such conduct should not be sanctioned.
In modern times, property changes hands rapidly and often, and it is desirable that the law provide protection to the unwary and unskillful. It may
be useful to attempt to reformulate the covenants into a single guarantee that
will provide all-encompassing protection against unscrupulous or fraudulent
conveyancing. In this regard, the statutory implication might be expanded
to strengthen the legal protection it now offers.
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